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The ability to shift knowledge and resources from federal laboratories to 
industrial and academic partners and vice versa is the primary reason that technology 
transfer (T2) exists today.  Without the cooperation of federal, state, and private agencies 
working together to resolve today’s technology quandaries, a lot of the breakthroughs 
experienced today would not exist.  This research was focused on uncovering which 
mechanisms are utilized by scientists and engineers.  The research entails uncovering 
both official and unofficial mechanisms and ascertaining why some methods are 
preferred over others.  It is also a secondary focus, to determine which barriers are 
impeding T2 from occurring in a more fluid fashion and what lab employees are doing to 
overcome these obstacles.  An interview methodology was utilized and interviews were 
conducted on all levels of personnel throughout the Air Force Research Laboratory 
population to identify those preferred mechanisms and the reasons associated with their 
use.  It was discovered that official and unofficial mechanism usage is about equal, but 
there were organizations that did not utilize them as prevalently; this was because of a 
lack of total infrastructure.  Infrastructure must be improved for official mechanisms 
while leveraging the use of those unofficial mechanisms; laboratory leadership must 
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For the past 20 years, both Congress and presidents have joined efforts to 
establish a formalized policy that allows federal organizations to transfer technology to 
non-federal organizations [1].  These non-federal organizations include industry, state 
and local governments, and academic institutions.  Technology Transfer (T2) policy was 
created as a simple way for the government laboratories and other non-federal entities to 
share a vast knowledge base of information that includes personnel, facilities, methods, 
expertise, technical information, and of course developed technologies [1].  T2 is unique 
in the sense that it does not need formal acquisition contracts in place in order for two 
organizations to interact, although contracts have been used in the past to accomplish T2.  
This uniqueness allows information exchange to occur without the impedance of all the 
bureaucracy government contracts bring to the table.  
T2 has evolved tremendously since its first inception in the 1980’s.  Changes have 
been made to both how T2 is conducted and who is targeted in the process.  In its early 
days, the transfer of technology was intended as a means of commercializing 
technologies developed in laboratories; government employees saw this new mandate as 
just another meaningless directive and was handled as such [2].  In more recent years, T2 
has taken on a different role in that it is concentrating mainly on adding value to currently 
existing Air Force programs [2].  The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) 
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community defines T2 as, “the process by which knowledge, facilities, or capabilities 
developed in one place or for one purpose are transferred and utilized to another place for 
another purpose to fulfill actual or potential public or domestic needs [3].”  Yet another 
entity defines T2 as, “an umbrella term that refers to an entire range of activities involved 
in developing new technologies and their applications for the marketplace [4].”  This new 
way of looking at transferring technology includes techniques like bringing in additional 
outside funds, expanding capabilities through the sharing of facilities and equipment, and 
reducing the schedule of programs through the collaboration of projects [2].  T2 can be 
accomplished in one of three distinct ways:  spin-off, spin-on, or co-development.  
During spin-off, a technology developed in a government lab attempts to be 
commercialized by industry, while in spin-on, the complete opposite occurs; a 
technology developed by industry is adapted for government use.  Co-development is the 
preferred technique and involves both parties’ involvement from the beginning of 
technology development.  The overall outcome of these combined efforts usually results 
in a successful transition of technology to the user. 
Although technology transition is often used interchangeably with technology 
transfer, and even though both terms are related, there is a definite distinction between 
the two expressions.  Within the AFRL community, technology transfer occurs when this 
interchange of knowledge, facilities, or capabilities happens between a government 
agency and a private or commercial entity, whereas technology transition is often 
referred to as an interchange between government agencies for the sake of delivering a 


















Figure 1.  Technology Transfer Concept [2] 
 
believe that transfer facilitates an easier transition process and those that believe that 
transition is impossible without adequate transfer [5].  
Unfortunately, even though the Air Force has gone to great measures to establish 
and disseminate official mechanisms to accomplish T2, it is feared that these instruments 
are not as extensively used as anticipated [5].  There also exists the possibility that 
individuals are using unofficial mechanisms to bridge the gaps that are required.  The Air 
Force T2 program manager desires to discern which official mechanisms are being used 
more frequently and identify those unofficial mechanisms which are being applied with 
success.  In addition, the AFRL T2 office is greatly interested in recognizing the actual 
players that are involved in the everyday transfer of technology.  
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Motivation and Relevancy 
The Air Force T2 program office has been given the daunting task of 
implementing a series of T2 directives.  These directives involved the establishment of a 
physical office as the focal point for all T2 activities within a particular agency called the 
Office of Research and Technology Applications (ORTAs) and that these agencies plan 
and budget for technology transfer efforts.  It was expected that these supplementary 
efforts be accomplished with already existing resources; there was little or no mention of 
whether additional resources might be needed or provided.  The program office 
understands that the apparent success of federal laboratories depends highly on the ability 
to transfer technology effectively to industry.  It is the feeling of this office that although 
T2 is being accomplished within their labs, it is only occurring within small pools of 
personnel; they believe that most of the T2 is not being reported or tracked [5].  The goal 
of this research is to investigate and identify those key personnel within the labs that are 
involved in large amounts of successful T2.  As players are identified, the next logical 
step is to divulge which mechanisms they are utilizing most and why.  This research 
hopes to establish a relationship between the mechanisms utilized, the distinct aspects of 
the technology, and the personnel involved.  The Air Force and other defense 
organizations have much to gain from a study of this type. 
  The failure and delay of past programs can never be attributed to one single 
reason.  Instead, it can be said that failing at transferring or transitioning a technology can 
at times lead to an unsuccessful program; these failures could be minimized through the 
dissemination of best practices used throughout the Air Force.  T2 should be looked at as 
a program “enhancer” and not so much as a simple criterion that establishes the failure or 
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success of a program.  Through the proper use of T2, not only can government agencies 
benefit and make their programs more successful, but they can also be encouraging 
industry to be an active participant in the transfer process. 
             
Research Objectives 
The objective of this research is to identify and assess the inner workings of how 
and why scientists and engineers at all levels interact with industry to accomplish T2.  
This research will focus on where in the chain is the interaction and communication 
occurring and where it is being most effective.  Thus, the overarching research question 
to be answered by this study is:   
“How do scientists and engineers at the AFRL interact with industry to accomplish 
technology transfer?” 
The term “how” is all encompassing in that not only is the research focused on the 
mechanisms used, but it also covers the players involved and the conditions surrounding 
the practice of these mechanisms.  This piece leads to the assessment portion that this 
research is aimed at discovering.  In order to answer this question, both official and 
unofficial tools and mechanisms employed are to be uncovered; it is also important to 
determine why these specific tools were used.  Again, the “why” in question, is the 
second piece to the assessment.  And lastly, the research will determine whether the use 
of certain mechanisms is correlated with performance reports or tracked metrics.  All 
these topics lead up to the formulation of the investigative questions which will be more 




Scope of Work 
This research is specifically focused on how scientists and engineers within the 
AFRL community are interacting with industry to accomplish T2.  It is specifically 
focused on directorates within AFRL located at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base 
(WPAFB).  Appendix D gives a visual representation of all AFRL research sites, their 
directorates, and their geographical locations.  Besides those labs found at WPAFB, there 
are other Air Force organizations that involve themselves in T2; Air Logistic Centers 
(ALCs), Test Centers, Product Centers, and other independent Air Force organizations all 
involve themselves in T2 as well [3].  A complete list of these organizations can be found 
in Appendix C.  The decision to select this group as the sample size for this research was 
based on both the interests of the Air Force T2 program office and the knowledge that 
approximately 70% of all reported Air Force T2 occurs within the AFRL community [6].  
A group of 26 interviewees was chosen at random from the AFRL directorates.  Because 
of the type of results gathered from the interviews, an interview methodology will be 











II. Literature Review 
Introduction  
The overall objective of the literature search is to encapsulate all of the historical 
data that has been uncovered.  Staying true to the research objectives, the first sections 
concentrate on giving factual information pertaining to official T2 mechanisms and the 
history of T2 legislation leading up to today.  The next four sections partition the barriers 
that impede T2 from occurring.  The following two sections, pertaining to strategies and 
industry, give a brief synopsis of practices currently being used outside of the 
government sector.  The final segment concerning metrics and measures is important 
because of the future recommendations expressed in Chapter V.  Appendix A contains an 
acronym list and is provided as a quick reference for the reader.   
 
Official Technology Transfer Mechanisms 
The Air Force T2 program office recognizes about 19 different mechanisms that 
can assist with T2 between government and industry.  One hundred percent of these 
mechanisms were mentioned in the interviews conducted for this research and will be 
discussed within the results of Chapter IV of this thesis.  Below is a compilation of these 
official mechanisms, their definitions, and their intended uses. 
Contracts are by far the most recognized and most used method; a contract is 
entered into by a government and industry entity in which the contractor is required to 
supply services to the government [7].  The reason why this method is so widely used is 
because most of the contracts utilized have been in place for a long time and no extra 
effort is necessary to create one.  One of the benefits of using contracts is the possibility 
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to fund Research and Development (R&D) projects that will eventually be transferred to 
the private sector; this allows the government to retain Government Purpose License 
Rights (GPLR) to be used for future technologies [8].  The drawbacks of using contracts 
include the massive amounts of bureaucracy to include competition laws, requirements 
process, and Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) compliance [8]. 
A grant is considered an agreement between the government and a recipient, 
which grants funding and/or property to the recipient to support or stimulate research [7].  
Department of Defense (DoD) policy stipulates that research grants be awarded only to 
educational institutions, nonprofit organizations, and state/local governments.  
Educational grants are offered on a competitive basis [8].  Even though the recipient may 
retain titles to inventions, the government will still keep its GPLR [7].  Some of the 
downsides to grants are that during the performance period, very little interaction occurs 
between the two organizations and cost is usually fronted by the government side [8]. 
In an effort to increase competition within industry and allow smaller companies 
to become more competitive, the government has established both the Small Business 
Technology Transfer Program (STTR) and the Small Business Innovation Research 
(SBIR).  Within the STTR program, awards are made on a competitive basis to small 
business firms to conduct research and development jointly between the small business 
and a research institution [8].  STTR programs are categorized in phases according to the 
amount of money being awarded and the length of their work period; there are also strict 
stipulations that regulate the percentage of total work to be done by the small business 
and the research institution [8].  Although similar, SBIRs differ in the manner that they 
are awarded based on scientific and technical merit for meeting Air Force R&D needs 
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along with the potential for commercialization [8].  As with STTRs, SBIRs are also 
categorized under phases that dictate the amount of money awarded and the length of the 
work period [8]. 
Whenever a technology is encountered that has both military utility and sufficient 
potential to support a viable commercial industrial base, the T2 community encourages 
the use of the Dual Use Science & Technology (DUST) Program [9].  DUST programs 
are competitively selected and may even be jointly funded; this grants the DoD access to 
more affordable and advanced technology by leveraging commercial know-how and 
markets for military use [8].  The DUST program initially began as a pilot program and 
since then has been officially closed out, although some remnants still remain in certain 
agencies. 
       Cooperative Research Agreements (CRA) are simple agreements between the 
government and a recipient whereby money or property is transferred to support or 
stimulate research.  The two distinguishing traits that make this mechanism stand out are 
the ability for the government to provide direct funding to the participant and its use is 
guided by the FAR [8]. 
The Commercial Operations & Support Saving Initiative (COSSI) is not so much 
a mechanism as much as it is a suggested methodology which targets specific DoD 
Operations & Support (O&S) costs and tries to reduce them by routinely inserting 
commercial items into already fielded military systems [10].  When the government is 
accepting proposals from industry in its first stage, one of the proposals must include a 
for-profit firm and all proposals must include a written support from the “military 
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customer” [8].  The COSSI also began as a pilot program and since then has been 
officially closed out, as well. 
As part of the ever growing challenge for DoD to create a stronger economic 
base, the Mentor-Protégé Program (MPP) provides initiatives to large contractors to 
encourage them to assist smaller disadvantaged businesses (SDBs); this aid will enhance 
this company’s capabilities and allow them to better satisfy subcontract requirements [7].  
This interaction results in a win-win situation because it provides additional knowledge 
to the SDBs at no cost from their prime contractors and it fosters a long term relationship 
between prime and sub contractors for future contracts [8]. 
     Personnel Exchanges (PE) are usually conducted informally and typically end 
up being the first initial contact on the path to a more formal mechanism, i.e. contracts 
[7].  During these exchanges, arrangements are made for personnel to be swapped 
between government, education or industrial facilities; in general, proprietary 
information is not exchanged, the exchange is short-term, and is paid by the organization 
sending the personnel [8]. 
The Manufacturing Technology Program (ManTech) is not used as widely 
throughout the labs because of its specific focus; it develops new and improved 
manufacturing processes which facilitate more affordable production of weapon systems 
and individual components [8].  The large concentration of these efforts are focused on 
processes for manufacturing metals, composites, electronics and improving their factory 
floors and maintenance facilities [7]. 
Through Commercial Test Agreements (CTA), the DoD is given the authority to 
sell, rent, or lend government equipment or materials to any person or entity; some of the 
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uses in the past have included circumstances dealing with independent research, 
developmental programs, and demonstrations to friendly foreign governments [8]. 
Although Partnership Intermediaries (PIs) are not what has been described as an 
official mechanism, they are still deemed an important method in facilitating the transfer 
of technology.  These intermediaries consist of state or local government agencies that 
operate on a not-for-profit basis and enter into contracts or memorandums of 
understanding (MOUs) with the government to increase the likelihood of success of T2 
[8].  Entering into these agreements is quite lucrative because these partnership 
intermediaries tend to have the pulse on the technology available from those local 
companies and the interests they are pursuing.  One such example is the case of the 
development of TechMatch, a system produced under a Partnership Intermediary 
Agreement between AFRL and the West Virginia High Technology Consortium 
Foundation [11].  This tool is a web-enabled knowledge management system that assists 
the ORTAs by bringing pertinent information together into one source. 
Independent Research and Development (IR+D) is a program sponsored by DoD 
that encourages contractors to pursue independent research and development projects that 
could be of potential interest to the DoD [12].  Some of the benefits allow contractors to 
recover some of the costs incurred in doing this independent research which in turn 
reduces acquisition costs and overall life-cycle costs of military systems [12]. 
The government has learned over time that educational institutions can provide a 
much needed benefit when it comes to developing new technology; the Education 
Partnership Act (EPA) consists of a formal agreement between a federal agency or 
agencies and an educational institution to transfer and enhance technology applications 
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and provide assistance for all levels of education [7].  These institutions will have the 
assistance from laboratory personnel to teach or assist in developing courses and course 
materials and also provides manpower for laboratories in need of technicians to conduct 
experiments. 
Patent Licensing Agreements (PLAs) and Patents are two related methods of 
protecting exclusive new technology and the rights that go along with them.  Developing 
a patent is the first step in which a grant is issued by the U.S. government, thereby giving 
the inventor the right to exclude all others from making, using, or selling the invention 
within the United States; patents are upheld by both Federal law and the U.S. 
Constitution [7].  Patent Licensing involves consent by the patent owner to practice the 
patented invention in return for some valuable consideration, sometimes known as 
royalties [8].  These can be established from government to the private sector or vice 
versa, although depending on the situation, different rules do apply. 
One of the more common mechanisms is the Cooperative Research and 
Development Agreement (CRADA); its wide use can be attributed to the fact that the 
successful stories and lessons learned reported by the DoD involve T2 assisted by a 
CRADA [6].  The CRADA consists of a formal written agreement between one or more 
federal laboratories and one or more non-federal parties under which the government, 
through its laboratories, provides personnel, facilities, equipment, or other resources with 
or without reimbursement; although the collaboration involves the expenditure of funds, 
at no time may funds flow directly to a CRADA partner [13].  There must be a heavy 
emphasis placed on the fact that this tool is not a contracting instrument and therefore 
does not fall under normal FAR compliance.  The benefits of using CRADAs consists of 
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allowing the rights to inventions and other intellectual property to be negotiated within 
the agreement [8]. 
Alliances are considered to be an informal T2 tool that allows a laboratory to enter 
into either an MOU or a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with a group of companies, 
laboratories, or educational institutions in order to pursue common interests [7].  The 
MOU/MOA is just the catalyst for what later develops into a more formal T2 mechanism.  
Depending on how it is perceived, these memorandums are non-binding documents 
which just outline the principles between partners [8]. 
There are occasions when either the government or a contractor owns a unique 
and expensive facility or piece of scientific equipment.  Instead of investing funds into 
purchasing a completely new system, the government prefers to utilize the Use of 
Facilities and Loaned Equipment as a formal means to transfer technology.  This method 
is used when certain facilities are unique and complex and the facilities contain 
experimental equipment and human expertise that would be hard to duplicate elsewhere 
[8]. 
Everything not mentioned above falls under the realm of Other Transactions 
except for contracts, grants, or cooperative agreements; these transactions are flexible 
agreements used to accomplish various legal purposes [8].  For the most part, they are 
used when developing a formal contract is not feasible and formal statutes and 
regulations will hinder the interaction. 
As demonstrated above, this is an all encompassing list of the mechanisms 
officially identified by the T2 program office; as this research will further prove, there are 
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other mechanisms being utilized on a consistent manner by many of the directorates 
within AFRL that often go unreported. 
        
Technology Transfer Legislation 
Early in the 1980’s, Congress enacted a series of laws to promote the use of T2 
and provide T2 mechanisms and incentives [1].  These regulations were created with the 
sole purpose of promoting collaboration among federal and non-federal organizations.  
Table 1 includes a brief summary of some of those regulations and their implications. 
One item to notice about this list of legislations is the trend they follow and the 
issues they address; as this research will demonstrate in Chapter IV, most of the problems 
discovered in this study, are not addressed by regulations.  Even though CRADAs are in 
heavy use throughout the AFRL community, they are only one mechanism being 
addressed.  Although the Federal Laboratory Consortium (FLC) existed from the 
beginning, it didn’t receive any power until an official charter and funding mechanism 
were established in 1986 with the Federal T2 Act.  The FLC would be in charge, along 
with the guidance of the laboratories affected, of developing and administering 
techniques, training courses, and reading materials to further increase awareness among 
the T2 community.  In essence, the FLC would serve as a focal point for all T2 activities 










Technology Transfer Channels 
Even though T2 is an Air Force mandated instruction, it is still unclear within the 
policy how this T2 interaction is to occur.  This is how channels and mechanisms differ; 
channels involve how the interaction is to occur while mechanisms are the tools used to 
enhance the interaction.  This initial contact phase is where it is expected that most of the 
problems occur or what causes T2 to ultimately be unsuccessful.  It is known that initial 
contact is made at many levels within the hierarchy of organizations and depends heavily 
on the situation encountered [5].  The T2 program office is familiar with four distinct 
channels in which T2 currently occurs.  There exists the traditional method known as top-
down interaction where the upper management of an organization instructs subordinate 
workers to involve themselves with T2.  This usually occurs as a result of a previous 
established relationship or through mutual interests shared among organizations.  T2 is 
also known to have occurred through scientist-to-scientist interaction which is aided 
through the attendance of formal and informal gatherings.  A third way communication 
happens is when an ORTA facilitates the communication process between the 
government office and industry [5].  Essentially, the ORTA representative serves as an 
honest broker in connecting the essential people to facilitate T2 [14].  ORTAs are usually 
represented within each laboratory through specific individuals that have been assigned 
the duty.  Although ORTAs are ultimately responsible under federal law to assist in the 
T2 process, it does not always occur in that manner.  The fourth and final channel of 
communication is when non-profit PIs put forth the effort to bring together industry and 
the government [5].    
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Technology Transfer Infrastructure 
It is a recurring theme in both government and in the industry arenas that the 
proper infrastructure to conduct T2 in an efficient manner is mostly absent.  It has been 
demonstrated through countless case studies that T2 is usually conducted in an ad-hoc 
fashion and that dedicated resources are rarely applied to work these efforts [15].  In a 
recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report given to Congressional 
committees, the report pulled some of the more renowned best practices from industry 
and tried to offer suggestions to the DoD on how to conduct T2 more cost effectively and 
more efficiently.  In particular, the document pays mention to two important resources 
that are currently missing within the DoD arena.  Throughout this document, the GAO 
report refers to “technology transition” as the overall effort to hand off and integrate 
mature technologies; this research has already addressed the difference between 
transition and transfer.   
Although this report is concerned with the entire process of transitioning a 
technology, for the purposes of this research, only the results relating to transferring 
technology were used.  The report suggested that DoD establish and utilize relationship 
managers to help the transfer process along; it also suggested the dedication of R&D 
funds to facilitate the evolution from a lab product to one that can be utilized by a 
program office [15].  The DoD believes that they are already doing the work of the 
relationship managers through the various types of formal agreements that can be 
established with industry; they are still failing to understand that there is a certain level of 
person-to-person interaction and dedication that must occur to aid these agreements.  
This of course takes extra man-hours and can incur travel costs as well. 
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One of the major findings from the GAO report that deserves mention is the 
ability for an organization to be able to strategically plan.  They define strategic planning 
as the effort to identify desirable technologies and prioritize resources.  Leading 
companies tend to organize their research and development efforts into what they call 
technological “thrusts [15].”  These thrusts are revisited on an annual basis to ensure that 
long-term company needs are being met and that the correct people are being assigned to 
these projects.  Figure 2 is a representation of the general flow of technology on its way 
to transition.  It shows where strategic planning is to occur and it shows where T2 occurs 
also--in the first shaded box labeled “explore.” 
Along with having the appropriate strategy, an organization must also have the 
correct policies in place.  In a recently published article, Goth examined the T2 culture of 
other countries, in particular that of the Chinese.  He found that many Chinese 
companies, although committed to T2, could not demonstrate what policies were in place 
to address such issues as the rights to licensing and patents [16].  This is because of the 
undue top-   
down pressure the research community is facing which is resulting in pools of unused 
technology with questionable value.      
 
 
Figure 2.  Technology Flow [15] 
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A perfect example of how commercial companies are handling some of these 
issues is briefly explained in a case study done on Siemens Corporate Technology.  From 
their studies and their experiences, they have taken away some key factors that have 
aided in their success.  They found that early and ongoing collaboration between 
academia and industry proved to be favorable in guiding the technology in the right 
direction; this of course can only be done with the appropriate dedicated resources.  They 
also placed heavy emphasis on acquiring early sponsorship for the technology and be 
able to set aside resources to develop prototypes that can demonstrate a capability [17].  
Putting this into perspective, it can soon be realized that a successful transfer depends 
heavily on the resources that are already in place. 
 
Intellectual Property Rights 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) can be thought of as a subset of infrastructure; 
how the federal government handles IPR is a mentality that makes up an important 
cornerstone of how T2 is conducted.  IPRs are related to GPLRs; IPR is the generic term 
given to those ideas associated with a technology that are developed by an entity, while 
GPLR refers specifically to rights associated with a product that the government owns.  
Throughout the results discussed in Chapter IV, the factor of IPR playing a role in how 
T2 is conducted proves to be a significant issue worth mentioning.  Furthermore, in a 
recent publication dated June 2006, Bellais and Guichard, believed that the lack of an 
intellectual property rights culture strongly inhibits the ability to spin-off technology 
[18].  They explain that T2 from a defense to a civilian application is hardly a simple 
process where the technology can be commercialized after a few uncomplicated 
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modifications.  Transfer mechanisms tend to be long and complex processes in which co-
development is occurring.   
The civilian perception concerning defense activities resides in the idea that 
defense innovations must be protected through secrecy rather than through patents.  
There is a distinct manner in which civilian technology is protected; even though secrecy 
is one option, as is the case with the Coca-Cola formula, it is not the most viable one 
because it does not provide legal protection from imitation and unwanted use [18].  
Because of the business the military is in, that is providing strategic superiority while 
denying access to such information to potential enemies, the DoD has not promoted an 
IPR culture within the industrial and technological base.  Through their research, the 
authors have been able to demonstrate that this lack of adopting an IPR culture has (1) 
shown that protecting every piece of information is not always relevant because not all 
information has strategic value and therefore counteracts the possibility of 
commercializing defense R&D results, and (2) the lack of an IPR culture has acted as a 
brake when interaction between industry and the government was warranted [18]. 
   IPR also affects the mechanisms that are chosen and utilized more often; it is 
believed that transfer is more likely to occur when there is a formal contract in place that 
clarifies each party’s duties and rights [19].  In fact, a lot of companies will be reluctant 
to invest additional funds into R&D when they are unsure of the possibility of recovering 
their return on investment (ROI).  The type of mechanism used, and more importantly the 
contract design within, is a crucial aspect in making T2 a success since it will define IPRs 




Barriers that Impede Technology Transfer 
According to the article, “Improvement of T2 from Government Laboratories to 
Industry”, one-sixth of all scientists and engineers in the U.S. are employed by federal 
laboratories and spend about $20B annually, yet have produced only 5% of all patents 
licensed for commercial use [20].  The barriers that exist today which affect the progress 
of T2 have been known and identified as far back as the mid 1990’s.  These barriers can 
take on a variety of different forms that include information type, environment, 
relationship context, and subtle cultural barriers [21].  These different barriers will be 
described in more detail below. 
Technological information that is ready for dissemination must be prepared in a 
form that is useful to the recipient.  In a study completed in 1996 which focused on the 
transportation industry, Local Technical Assistance Program (LTAP) centers were used 
in translating T2 topics and orienting them towards the proper audiences through the use 
of summary articles and quarterly newsletters [21].  Because of the great quantity of 
reports these centers were receiving, they had little choice but to distribute these reports 
in their original format and encouraged those agencies submitting their reports to adapt 
them to target audiences. 
The LTAP centers have recognized that where T2 is occurring, or the 
environment, is also important to the audiences involved [21].  A lot of these local 
agencies are working with limited travel budgets that prevent them from attending 
workshops or seminars where T2 often occurs; the problem of limited manpower also puts 
them into a predicament since it forces them to shut down their operation for the day 
[21].  LTAP centers have resolved these problems by sending the workshops directly to 
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the local agencies when possible and also by hosting conferences at reasonably priced 
establishments. Bringing together these conferences with the right people is just the first 
dilemma; the real challenge begins with the manner in which audiences are educated on 
T2.  Everything must be evaluated, from the type of medium used to present material, to 
the size of the audiences being utilized; it must all be tailored around the message intent 
[21].  
When relationship context is talked about, it is the ability for the outside 
community to trust that one person that is serving as the conduit for T2.  LTAP centers 
have realized that if there is a previous relationship established with one particular person 
in the community, that person is an invaluable asset in making T2 occur; these people 
should be key respected leaders that have already established networks [21].  This 
provides a much needed face-to-face contact that the community can relate to and 
therefore grow accustomed to interacting with. 
Cultural barriers are applicable when discussing obstructions that impede T2 
because of the differences that exist in the motivations to transfer technology between 
government R&D labs and private companies.  Federal labs are guided by strategic vision 
that is based on national needs while the private sector’s sole interest is to commercialize  
a product [22].  Table 2 summarizes these discrepancies that exist between the two 
cultures over different ideas.   
The LTAP centers have done a tremendous job in identifying those areas that 
need improvement to make T2 succeed, although their challenge lies in the continuance of 




Table 2.  Cultural Differences in R&D Labs and Private Industry [22] 
 
 
Technology Transfer Strategies 
Having discussed the legislation that guides T2 and the obstacles that have been 
encountered, this section will discuss some of the different strategies in use throughout 
industry that can be applied to diverse situations.  Depending on the players involved and 
the type of technology being transferred, a study done between Swedish academia and 
industry proved that a written strategy was necessary.  Below are some of their targeted 
strategies. 
Intensive collaboration implies that there are continuous and frequent meetings 
with the intended receiver of the technology during the project execution. People from 
both sides tend to work on the project together [23].  During user buy-in, the intended 
users of the technology see the value of the technology and help advocate the transfer 
[23].  Management buy-in compares in some ways to the first T2 strategy mentioned 
above; management at the receiving unit is convinced of the technology value [23]. 
Continuous updates are related to intensive collaboration and report on the project 
progress given from the transceiver to the receiver during the project execution. This 
does not necessarily entail that people from the receiving unit are involved in the project 
as if it were an intensive collaboration strategy [23].  Technology push, in this instance 
 23 
 
relates directly to the first T2 strategy mentioned above and is used if upper management 
takes a top-down decision of particular technology usage.  The mentality is that 
technology is being developed without a prior need established and is later pushed on the 
user.  Technology pull, on the other hand, involves user involvement and interaction at all 
levels and is developed for a specific need or deficiency.   
Along with the more traditional strategies mentioned above, there are more 
practical means of succeeding at T2.  Establishing an organization as a known and 
reliable technology source within a community is one of the hardest tasks to accomplish.  
In his article “Building Relationships for Technology Transfer”, John Bennett, believes 
that there are certain key ingredients that should be in place in order for T2 to occur 
seamlessly.  He mentions that building a base of mutual respect and trust is essential to 
carry on an on-going relationship with a certain entity.  When T2 is thought of, long-term 
and careful considerations must be taken to achieve a certain level of mutual benefits 
from the endeavor [24].  This will be demonstrated as an important factor among the 
interviewees, discussed in Chapter IV. 
  
Technology Transfer in Industry and Academia   
Although this research focuses on T2 from the perspective of the government labs, 
there should still be focus on what it is that industry and academia are doing to facilitate 
T2.  Even after more that ten years after the inception of T2 regulations in the early 
1980’s, in 1993 experts still believed that federal government R&D and the U.S. industry 
plodded down parallel paths on their ways to better technologies [25].  In particular, the 
U.S. Bureau of Mines (BOM) found it difficult to perform T2 in an efficient manner until 
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they discovered the use of CRADAs.  If there was one lesson to be learned by the BOM, 
it was that in order to succeed with industry, they must focus their efforts on partnerships, 
collaborative research, and on encouraging input and guidance from customers [25]. 
Trune and Goslin revealed in an article concerning U.S universities that the most 
productive T2 occurs in those that are centered around medical schools and technological 
institutes [26].  It wasn’t until 1980, with the Bayh-Dole Act, that universities were 
granted the right to patents; this piece of legislation showed a large peak in the interest of 
universities in T2.  Universities have different goals and motivations that direct them to 
want to participate in T2.  When they involve themselves in these efforts, they must worry 
about aspects like higher faculty salaries, maintaining a T2 office, gap funding for high 
potential research projects, additional space to conduct research, and lawyer fees [26].  
All of these expenditures sometimes are a deterrent for smaller universities that don’t 
have the adequate overhead to cover these costs.        
From an industry point of view, it is believed that the success of a transfer of 
technology is dependant on the quality of the communication between two organizations 
and the quality of written documentation that is filed [27].  According to a study done at 
the Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) technology center, it was discovered that the 
government tends to hire consultants to introduce new technologies but they end up 
against a one-way communication barrier [27].  Technology developers have also had the 
experience of having to implement some of these methods through poorly documented 
information.  These hurdles combined with an incorrect blend of people involved in the 
process, CSC found to be detrimental to the T2 process.  CSC found their success when 
 25 
 
everyone from management, developers, and process groups attained an equal voice and 
when their efforts where documented correctly to be used and refined in the future [27]. 
In order for T2 to occur, and to occur correctly, it has to follow a rigorous process 
approval from inception.  According to a study done at the Technical University of 
Eindhoven in the Netherlands they called this initiation stage the Technology 
Engineering Phase; the success of a T2 process depends on this phase being done 
correctly [28].  The main attraction for introducing a new process revolves around either 
cost cycle reduction or product quality improvements.  In their first step, a business case 
must be established that incorporates the benefits expected from the T2 and takes into 
account obstacles to be overcome.  In the second step, a stakeholder analysis must be 
developed in which users must be convinced of the technology; in this step it is 
imperative that the users become involved and that they provide as much feedback as 
possible.  The third and fourth steps involve identifying the methods used to implement 
these new processes and also to look ahead for potential risks and how to mitigate them 
[28].         
This research also uncovered that there are three distinct methods in which T2 
occurs within industry.  Communication can occur through a variety of mediums ranging 
from company conferences and symposiums to journals and reports.  No matter what the 
medium used, the research revealed that presenting T2 examples in a case study format 
proved to be the most effective [28].  Researchers also discovered that the level of 
involvement within the organizations implicated also played a large part in the success of 
T2.  The more management levels that were involved in the process, the more chances for 
misinterpretation existed; companies with lower hierarchical staffs proved to be more 
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efficient in applying T2 methods.  The second factor they attribute to successful T2 
implementation is through the use of what they call “champions.”  Champions are 
responsible for the motivation of other employees and initializing steps towards 
incorporating new methods [28].  They accomplish this through a process they call 
change management.  With change management, champions are able to direct the efforts 
of their organizations and help control expectations of the new process.  Partially 
associated with the communication effects, is the measuring and reporting of RoI.  RoI is 
important when it comes to demonstrating expected outcomes and paves the path for 
future T2 endeavors [28]. 
 
Metrics and Measures 
There has been an ever growing perception that the federal labs are not getting a 
good return on investment from its R&D budget.  Because of this perception, there has 
been a growing demand for more measurable T2 [29].  Most of these measures tend to be 
unique to the organizations they represent.  The number of licenses granted and the 
amount of royalty income are just one example where federal labs have developed a 
metric which does not distinguish between simple and revolutionary breakthroughs, nor 
does it track whether these licenses are evolving into fruitful products [29].     
There are no formal methods dictated by policy for measuring the success of the 
T2 process.  The Air Force T2 program office explained that within their realm they keep 
track of certain metrics that help them measure the level of success of T2 ventures.  The 
first metric calculates the amount of funds being brought into the government 
organization [5].  This strictly applies to funds being paid to government agencies for 
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work performed; this includes the use and renting of certain testing facilities.  Secondly, 
the T2 offices track the amount of resources and capabilities that a federal office might 
gain and try to associate a dollar figure with these assets.  Thirdly, and most difficult, is 
calculating the amount of man hours saved by implementing the successful cases of T2 
[5]. 
This research’s intent is not to analyze effective measures and metrics, but they 
are discussed briefly due to the recommendations for future work that Chapter V 
proposes.  The leading companies reviewed by the 2006 GAO report use a variety of 
product metrics to evaluate the success of their transition programs.  Table 3 is a 
compilation of the metrics utilized in assessing lab projects and processes.  
Unfortunately, 
in companies like Motorola, these metrics are not treated with the same severity as those 
used after product development begins. 
 





The government has a difficult time quantifying the measures in Table 3 because 
it is a complicated task associating dollar figures with some of these processes.  On the 
other hand, companies like Motorola have an easier time quantifying these measures 
because they are able to calculate their results into a ROI.  They tend to measure 
everything to what they call a profit/loss statement; within this document they measure 


























It was decided that an interview methodology would work best for the type 
research that is to be conducted.  Since this research has an interest in discovering the 
habits of how scientists and engineers conduct T2, surveys would not provide sufficient 
insight and interaction with the interested subjects.  Person-to-person interviews were the 
preferred method for acquiring data.  A qualitative assessment was then chosen to 
analyze the data.  This section will also cover how question formulation was refined and 
how interviews were conducted.  It will also describe in detail which investigative 
questions were utilized in the interviews and what process was required to approve these 
questions.  This segment will conclude with how the subject sample was selected.    
 
Qualitative Assessment 
Much thought was given to the type of assessment that would be conducted in this 
research.  After careful scrutiny was given to the needs of the Air Force T2 program 
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office, it was concluded that it would provide the most benefit to present results in a 
qualitative manner.  The foundation of this research is to discover those mechanisms that 
are used by the scientists and engineers to accomplish T2 with industry.  It is not only an 
interest to identify these mechanisms but to understand the motivations of lab employees 
to use these methods.   
Qualitative results are not meant to provide statistical backed results; instead, this 
research is expected to reap results which represent more of a behavioral pattern among 
laboratory personnel.  There are many aspects that make qualitative studies unique from 
quantitative ones.  First, the technique used to collect data for this research was through 
personal one-on-one in-depth interviews.  Second, the use of open-ended questions is 
another facet which allows for findings that are more exhaustive.  Although generic 
questions were presented to all interviewees, there was latitude given to expound on 
certain topics.  Third, because of the manner in which questions are formulated, 
responses tend to give a bit more insight into people’s behavior, attitudes, and motivation 
[31]. 
Some of the drawbacks to using this type of analysis revolve around how 
subjectively results are interpreted.  It is believed that most qualitative research is based 
on small sample sizes and often does not represent the entire population well.  In the case 
of this research, it is fair to say that the population used is a reasonable representation of 
the whole.  Because of the flexible processes that are used, it is also hard to replicate any 
previous results; experts believe this gives these types of experiments a low reliability 
[31].  For the purposes of this research, the interest does not lie on replicating results, but 
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on observing the behaviors of scientists and engineers and their interaction with industry 
for which this analysis is well suited.                 
   
Question Formulation and Interview Process 
Once a qualitative analysis was decided upon, the next step was to begin the 
creation of the questionnaire.  The questions were written with one major thought in 
mind; they were written and asked in a manner such that the interviewee would be 
comfortable and not feel as if their work was being scrutinized.  Every individual was 
approached by the interviewee as a casual observer and not so much as an inspector that 
would report their findings.  Most of the interviewees were selected because of the 
successes their offices had reported in official documentation.  They were approached in 
a manner that identified them as a potential source of information on how to conduct T2 
and asked to share their experiences.  Additional interviewees were selected as a result of 
a recommendation from others interviewed.  This proved to be an exceptional method for 
acquiring contacts because it placed interviewees at ease knowing they had been 
recommended.  Questions were written and delivered in a manner that would not lead the 
interviewee to specific answers; this is a means of receiving sanitized answers from 
subjects.  Questions were also tailored specifically for certain people depending on their 
position and responsibilities within the organization.  As the interviews began, biases 
towards what felt were pertinent questions and what were the important aspects to focus 
on changed and helped in the refinement of the investigative questions mentioned in the 
below section.  The approach to how interviews were conducted to different levels of 
supervision also matured as the research progressed.  This allowed the research to 
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become more focused and also permitted the ability to avoid pursuing responses that 
were of no importance to the overall results of the research. 
 
Investigative Questions 
Listed below are the finalized questions as they were presented to the 
interviewees in each session.  Interviewees were given the necessary latitude to expound 
on their responses, but were asked to specifically answer these questions. 
  
1.  “What official tools/mechanisms are you aware of to assist the efforts of 
technology transfer?” 
 
2.  “What methods do you actually use?  Are there other types of interactions 
occurring besides the common used mechanisms?  Why do you prefer the use of 
these methods?” 
 
3.  “What obstacles do you see or do you encounter that prohibit the effective 
transfer of technology?  Can you or do you do anything to avoid these obstacles?” 
 
4. “Is the use of certain mechanisms or methods at all correlated/influenced 





These four questions were developed with only one thought in mind.  The 
purpose was to answer the overall research question presented in Chapter I.  The “how” 
in the overarching research question is covered by the topics in these four investigative 
questions. 
 
Institutional Review Board Approval Process 
The Institutional Review Board (IRB) Process is a unique method employed by 
the Air Force to approve any type of research that involves human subjects.  Although 
this process is intended more for medical research done on human subjects, nevertheless, 
since the interviews involve people, it must still be accomplished.   
The approval process involves a couple of steps that must be accomplished before 
interviewing can commence.  The first step requires the researcher to complete the online 
Basic Collaborative IRB Training Initiative (CITI) course.  The CITI course is tailored to 
teach researchers on the protection of human subjects involved in research.  Once the 
course is completed, a package must be drafted that includes the proposed questionnaire 
along with a letter requesting exemption from human experimentation requirements in 
accordance with Air Force Instruction (AFI) 40-402.  The request will be based on Code 
of Federal Regulations, title 32, part 219, section 101, paragraph (b) category (2):   
Research activities that involve the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, 
aptitude, achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures, or observation of 
public behavior unless: (i) Information obtained is recorded in such a manner that 
human subjects can be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the 
subjects; and (ii) Any disclosure of the human subjects' responses outside the 
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research could reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or 
be damaging to the subjects' financial standing, employability, or reputation [32].  
Appendix B contains the final approval letter received from the IRB to conduct 
interviews. 
  
Subject Sample Selection 
Selecting an appropriate sample size that would be representative of the entire Air 
Force T2 community was one of the more daunting tasks of this research.  The DoD 
Office of Technology Transition reports to Congress every five years on T2 efforts 
throughout all DoD agencies.  Included in this report is a breakdown by laboratory and 
center of all reported T2 mechanisms that occurred between 1998 and 2003 [6].  With the 
aid of this document, it was possible to pinpoint where all reported T2 mechanisms had 
occurred within the Air Force for those six years.  A summary of all Air Force agencies 
which reported T2 mechanisms for this span of years is summarized in Appendix C.  This 
was a good starting point for identifying which agencies would provide this research the 
largest benefit by providing the specific projects that had proven effective mechanisms in 
place. 
After careful evaluation of the document, it showed that close to 70% of all T2 
that occurs within the Air Force, takes place in the AFRL community and their 
directorates.  Even though the Air Force Material Command (AFMC) also showed large 
numbers of reported T2 mechanisms, they were not included in this study.  One agency 
within the Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC) was also included because of the advisory 
role they provide to the AFRL.  This document was also helpful in identifying the 
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specific organizations within each of these directorates that had had reported 
achievements; this was accomplished through their reported success stories. 
Once the organizations were identified, it was a simple task to contact specific 
people working within these groups.  All initial contacts were identified at random while 
all subsequent interviewees were based on recommendations.  In the end, a total of 26 
different individuals were interviewed spanning multiple directorates, different levels of 
hierarchy, and different technology specializations.  Table 4 summarizes these interviews 
by directorate only.  Contacts in certain directorates were more accommodating than in 
others, thus the discrepancy in numbers among agencies.  
 
























IV. Results and Conclusions 
Introduction 
This section is written in a format to aid T2 users to identify themselves through 
certain criteria.  This criteria is the basis for the separation of the results.  The first 
section pays mention to the major focus of this study and that is identifying those official 
mechanisms used to accomplish T2.  This section also analyzes and discusses reasons 
why some of these mechanisms are preferred and why some are not; this represents the 
assessment portion of this study.  Once official mechanisms are talked about, the next 
logical step is to discuss those mechanisms that are considered unofficial; these were 
built into eight distinct categories.  The third portion of this chapter discusses those 
barriers that were perceived by interviewees to prevent them from fully engaging in T2.   
Subsequently, an examination was conducted on the top five official and unofficial 
mechanisms.  This chapter will conclude with an analysis that demonstrates that labs 
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interviewed fall under either a technology push (investigative) or technology pull 
(support) system.   
 
Preferred Official Mechanisms    
It is not difficult identifying which mechanisms are used more abundantly; 
however, it is difficult to link mechanism use to specific organizations, technology type, 
or people involved.  The results demonstrated that amongst all the interviewees, they 
admitted to using all 19 mechanisms mentioned in Chapter II in one form or another.  
Some mechanisms were favored over others and it could be inferred that this partiality is 
associated with technology type or the organizations involved.  This section will only 
focus on a select few mechanisms that stood out in the results.  Table 5 shows a synopsis 
of all 26 responses and which official mechanisms they admitted to using.  The STTR 
and SBIR programs were combined due to their known similarity concerning focus and 
funds used, as were PLAs and Patents; PLAs only derive from an already approved 
patent.  The table shows both cumulative mechanism usage among all interviewees 
(shown at the bottom of the table) and partial use amid the different directorates (shown 
within the cells).  Percentages are not meant to be cumulative and should not be expected 
to add up to 100%.  Results will show overlaps due to interviewees employing multiple 
mechanisms.    
Sixty-five percent of the interviewees acknowledged having used CRADAs in 
their everyday work, although the remaining recognized to having known someone who 
had.  The interviewees attributed their use of CRADAs to the availability of information 
and people with the knowledge to use them.  This information and knowledge is found 
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within the ORTA offices mentioned earlier.  Although CRADAs are not easy to establish, 
they do make it simple to utilize by other related organizations once they are in place.  
CRADAs, like other official mechanisms, take time to establish and must go through a 
series of revisions by lawyers that represent both interested parties.  Sometimes this is a 
deterrent for inexperienced organizations.  Those groups that had previously gone 
through the rigorous approval process reaped the benefits of having multiple CRADAs in 
place.  Because of their flexibility, federal organizations with similar interests can piggy-
back off of already existing CRADAs and therefore forego the approval process. 
 
Table 5.  Official Technology Transfer Mechanism Usage 
 
**Results are not meant to be cumulative; will not add to 100% 
 
There were several examples worth mentioning were CRADAs have proved 
successful.  The Prop directorate achieved a great accomplishment when they finalized a 
CRADA with Chevron™.  Since a big percentage of their work relates to investigative 
work with fuels technology, fuel additives, and alternative fuels, it makes sense to team 
up with one of the leading commercial fuel experts [33].  This relationship was originally 
established through the attendance of conferences at which they presented papers.  The 
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relationship matured from there and evolved into a formal mechanism.  The directorate 
has been involved in many co-development projects in which cost sharing has been used 
and benefits garnered by both sides.        
In the HE directorate although the interviewees declared that most of their work 
revolved around support to the user, a lot of their breakthroughs could be considered 
investigative in nature.  Most recently, they established a CRADA with Boeing which 
allowed them to fully equip a battle lab.  This battle lab was set up to simulate the 
Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) which is currently found on the Air 
Force’s E-3 Sentry aircraft.  The lab is trying to solve a problem that has been plaguing 
operators on this platform for years--the organized delivery of voice communication 
traffic that operators can understand and utilize efficiently.  The lab has developed a 
technology called “spatial audio” in which separate and distinct communication channels 
can be heard over a single set of earphones.  Since testing on the actual platform proved 
to be too expensive, they opted to construct a simulated lab.  Boeing was the obvious 
choice for this CRADA because of their involvement as the prime contractor for the 
airframe.  The initial contact had already been established through either a past 
developmental contract or a current support contract.  The government labs received all 
the equipment necessary to equip the lab at no cost to them while Boeing has been 
receiving results from tests conducted.   
The M&M directorate appeared to have the most diverse thoughts on the use of 
CRADAs.  As has been the case with other directorates, the M&M directorate was no 
different when it came to leveraging existing CRADAs.  One of the divisions teamed up 
with a company known as Excera™ whose expertise lies in materials manufacturing.  In 
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particular, the government labs have been investigating the use of different materials for 
body armor.  When they discovered that there was an existing CRADA with this 
company, it was a simple process to modify and insert the additional requirements.  Other 
interviewees expressed that even though CRADAs were widespread in their division, 
they lacked the expertise to know the benefits of their use.  Still yet another situation 
involved an interviewee at the branch chief level who believed that CRADAs were not 
appropriate for their organization.  Their workload consists of providing responsive 
information back to the field units on a variety of airframes.  Because of the nature of this 
work, they consider that teaming up or requiring the aid of an outside organization could 
result in the appearance of contaminated outcomes.  Therefore, they choose to do most of 
their work in-house, without the support of industry. 
It appears that the use of CRADAs is highly favored among those directorates that 
have the in-house and past experience.  It can also be concluded that CRADAs are a great 
benefit to the government when they do not have the funds available to enter into formal 
contracts.  It allows both parties to reap the rewards with a minimal investment.   
Approximately 35% of the interviewees admitted to having some type of contract 
in place with industry that helps them facilitate T2.  Contracts that have been in place for 
extended periods of time serve a great purpose due to the rapport already established 
between the government and the outside agency.  Although contracts require FAR 
compliance which involves high levels of bureaucratic involvement, if the relationship is 
a good one, modifications can be inserted with ease. 
    AFRL appears to have an established link with the University of Dayton 
Research Institute (UDRI).  All of the directorates interviewed admitted to having a 
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contract in place with UDRI except for ASC.  Although the intricacies of each contract 
were not discussed, the purpose for each was.  For the most part, the labs utilize these 
contracts to supply additional manpower to government labs in the form of scientists, lab 
technicians, and engineers.  In addition to providing this extra manpower, UDRI is also 
bringing a specific skill set that might not be present in the lab.  Some of the branches 
within the directorates also provide the latitude to these contractors to accomplish 
investigative research; all of this work must be related to the established needs and 
mission of the particular lab. 
Attention must be paid to those mechanisms that are used less often but are 
nevertheless important to the transfer of technology.  Patent licensing and patents were 
mentioned in various interviews but the consensus demonstrated that their use is very 
limited to specific technologies.  Some interviewees expressed concerns that many of the 
technologies licensed finish up without a customer need.  The HE directorate, on the 
other hand, develops many technologies, such as “spatial audio”, that have important 
commercial applications as well.  Being able to control IPR issues is one of the primary 
reasons for the significant use of PLAs within this directorate.   
SBIRs were also a mechanism that was heavily utilized even though most 
interviewees agreed that the results from these efforts usually end up unused, too.  Many 
of the offices have dedicated funds that must be used towards SBIR initiatives; this is the 
main reason why they involve themselves in these endeavors.  The HE directorate also 
showed to contain the bulk of the users for EPAs.  The interviewees explained that they 
favored the use of EPAs because it not only established a good rapport with a learning 
institution for future studies, but it also afforded them the manpower to conduct a lot of 
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their research.  Since operators are hard to come by because of overseas deployment 
demands, the HE directorate has resorted to using trained students to conduct their 
AWACS battle lab experiments.   
Throughout this research, only one partnership intermediary was encountered that 
served as the specific liaison for that directorate.  Other organizations admitted to using 
them in the past, but the M&M directorate was distinct in that they had hired an outside 
not-for-profit agency to provide a body in-house to specifically concentrate on T2.  
Personnel exchanges played an important role in some agencies; it allowed them the 
exchange of knowledge without incurring any additional costs.  The benefits ended up 
being similar for both parties and costs were incurred by the traveling side.  In the case of 
the use of facilities and loaned equipment, those agencies involved in this form of T2, 
admitted that it tended to occur only with the help of an already established contract.  
The Prop directorate also showed a trend of having the only interviewees to favor 
the use of CRAs.  A possible motive for using CRAs lies in the fact that the propulsion 
directorate is heavily involved in basic research.  Their type of basic research must be 
very focused and does not afford the possibility of squandering funds on wasted efforts.  
Through the use of CRAs, they are allowed to write very specific contract proposals that 
are competed to the best bidder.  These contracts bind the government and contractor to 
specific terms. 
It can be concluded from these results which mechanisms are most favored by 
these labs and the circumstances associated with them.  It can also be deduced which 
mechanisms are seldom utilized; the qualitative results provide insight into why these 
mechanisms are not favored as much.                                
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Unofficial Technology Transfer Mechanisms 
Besides those official mechanisms mentioned above, there were other methods 
implemented by many of the labs which were utilized in accomplishing T2.  Many of 
these unofficial mechanisms were not referred to as such by the interviewees, but as 
everyday procedure.  For the purpose of this research the unofficial mechanisms were 
divided into eight distinct categories.  A summary of the findings can be found in Table 
6.  The table shows both cumulative mechanism usage among all interviewees (shown at 
the  
Table 6.  Unofficial Mechanism Usage 
 
**Results are not meant to be cumulative; will not add to 100% 
 
bottom of the table) and partial use amid the different directorates (shown within the 
cells).  Percentages are not meant to be cumulative and should not be expected to add up 
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to 100%.  Results will show overlaps due to interviewees employing multiple 
mechanisms.    
 According to the results acquired, informal gatherings which are comprised of 
conferences, symposiums, and seminars were the most prevalent among the interviewees; 
fifty percent of all interviewees were involved with these.  Gatherings are established for 
many purposes and the participation varies greatly.  There are instances where these 
assemblies are focused on particular technologies as is the case with the M&M 
directorate; their interests lie within areas like non-destructive inspection, composite 
materials, and aging aircraft issues.  They are a great forum in which to present best 
practices and establish a rapport with commercial partners.  For the most part, these 
congregations are open to everyone, both government and industry, as long the 
information being disclosed is not classified.  Not only does DoD implement these 
methods, but organizations like NASA also utilize symposiums to bring together 
researchers, sponsors, and other programs [34].  There are other instances where less 
formalized gatherings occur and they involve more general sharing of information.  Both 
government and commercial agencies are responsible for setting these up.  One of the 
limiting factors to these gatherings is that they are heavily governed by the amount of 
funds an organization is allowed to spend on these efforts which ties back in with the 
overall strategic vision of that agency.   
The next most widespread method utilized, involves the use of specialized 
committees, integrated product teams (IPTs), technical interchanges, and working 
groups.  These will be referred to as formal gatherings.  These differ from the other 
gatherings in one aspect.  These groups have been established for a common purpose.  
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Members are hand-picked out of a sea of experts to come together and resolve specific 
issues.  The experts will include individuals from the research labs, end users, and 
industry partners.  Their relationship tends to be bound first by some type of formal 
agreement which initially brings them together.  Since the goals of these groups are so 
specific, once problems have been resolved, this collection of people will disband until 
the next time they are required. 
Within the Prop directorate, they bring together on a consistent basis, a panel of 
experts to discuss new technologies that could have a commercial viability.  Once they 
have agreed on those that have the greatest chance of being successful, they bring in 
industry partners to discuss ways of transferring this technology [33].  In the HE 
directorate one of their main focuses includes improvements to the operators on the 
AWACS platform.  Since the AWACS is an aircraft that is utilized by other countries 
besides the U.S., they have formed a working group specifically to resolve those issues.  
This working group is comprised of U.S government employees, U.S. industry, and 
international governments and industry [35].  These gatherings prove to be a very 
beneficial mechanism for T2; the most difficult aspect is bringing together the precise 
type of people collectively.  As the next paragraph will show, certain directorates have 
developed methods to counter this problem with bringing the right people together. 
One of the more interesting results brought out by this research was the finding of 
individuals referred to as “co-locates”.  Co-locates are usually government employees, 
either military or civilian, which although employed by the federal labs are positioned 
physically in places where they can interact with both industry and the end user in a 
simple manner.  Having their offices sometimes half way across the U.S. from their labs, 
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they make use of their location by reaching out to both the user and industry to receive 
feedback on both party’s needs.  Co-locates are responsible for initiating the first contact 
between the federal labs and industry in what could later develop into a formal T2 
mechanism.  In the case of the M&M directory, they choose to place their co-locates at 
aircraft and logistics centers.  These centers are responsible for implementing new 
techniques developed by both laboratories and industry concerning their related 
platforms.  Having the co-locates situated there allows them to get the pulse of the 
platform’s user and relay that information back to the lab and commercial partner through 
person-to-person contact.  In a recent descriptive analysis conducted less than two years 
ago, results showed that person-to-person contacts were the most effective method for 
knowledge and T2 [36]. 
The use of co-locates has proven to serve a few distinct purposes.  First, their 
location allows them to interact and establish a link among the important players 
handling T2.  This places them in a situation that cannot be duplicated by those scientists 
and engineers located in the laboratories.  And second, by being so close to the user, they 
are able to experience first-hand the dilemmas encountered by the user.  All of their 
feedback can be transmitted simultaneously to both the laboratories and industrial 
partners involved.    
Besides the everyday person-to-person communication, two of the directorates 
interviewed acknowledged using written reports and publications as a means to facilitate 
T2.  The positive aspect in using publications is that it grants access to almost anyone that 
is interested in the topic.  In the case of those agencies that utilized activity and lessons 
learned reports, it was less clear to who was given access to these reports.  These reports 
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were usually a mandatory part of communicating their progress to their superiors.  Only 
one interviewee admitted to knowing where their reports ended up; they were filed at that 
organization’s headquarters level.  It appeared that these reports were used mainly in an 
intra-organizational fashion.  There were no specific avenues for outside entities to get a 
hold of these reports except in those cases where articles were formally published.  One 
of the more important findings dealing with written reports was the so called “language” 
they were written in.  This does not refer to a particular country’s dialect, but to the style 
of writing and the intended audience.  Many of these reports use certain colloquialisms 
that are specific to certain areas of technology or that are known only in close circles.  
This poses a serious dilemma when outside observers are trying to apply these methods 
to their own organizations; it will undoubtedly render the reports ineffective.  This is a 
fairly common problem and has been identified previously in other research, such as in, 
“Effective-Industry Technology Transfer [37].”  The author explains that T2 tends to only 
work in environments where the technology level shared by everyone involved is the 
same.   
The FLC and Technology Transfer Integrated Product Team (TTIPT) are two 
federal entities whose key purpose is to handle T2 issues for the government.  Part of 
their efforts are directed towards the events they set up annually at which important T2 
issues are discussed.  Attendance to these meetings is quite firm.  TTIPTs are intended 
only for DoD professionals involved in T2.  The FLC has to two types of gatherings they 
hold, one at the national level and the other at the regional level.  The national level 
conference is much like the TTIPT in attendance, although other federal organizations 
like DOE and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) are also 
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included.  The regional conferences are the only gatherings in which industry and 
academia are present.   
A great amount of the interviewees that attended these functions, admitted to 
utilizing these events as a means to create a rapport with other federal agencies which in 
turn have helped them get in touch with industry partners.  These conferences also play 
an important role in disseminating new legislation, best practices, and lessons learned to 
the rest of the T2 community.  The few interviewees that admitted using these forums 
were not aware of the attendance constraints.  At the regional FLC conference, one 
interviewee mentioned that little effort is placed on agenda content and what might 
attract industrial partners to attend.  It is difficult to get a good response rate from the 
commercial and academic world unless they are brought in by something of interest. 
AFRL also sponsors a similar event to that of the FLC and TTIPT for local 
organizations; attendance includes AFRL directorates, WPAFB legal office, UDRI, 
Wright State University, and the University of Cincinnati.  These monthly meetings are 
used to share lessons learned and to disseminate new legislation involving T2.  What 
wasn’t made clear and is important to note, was who specifically attended these meetings 
and how was that information later circulated throughout their individual agencies.  
Another form of T2 mentioned only by the HE directorate was the use of International 
Cooperative R&D (ICR&D).  This interaction occurs primarily government to 
government, additionally, interviewees admitted that it helped them establish 
international industry partners in this manner.  The HE directorate was also the only one 
to mention the use of fellowships and scholarships to establish a rapport with academia.  
Their main purpose for this was to establish that initial contact with another research 
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institute while providing students an environment in which to develop their skills.  This 
initial contact has proven itself practical for future co-development projects between the 
two organizations. 
 
Official and Unofficial Mechanism Analysis 
The interviews conducted have shown that within the M&M, Prop, and HE 
directorates in particular, the top mechanism used was an official one.  As one starts to 
venture down the list, it is obvious that the use official mechanisms begin to taper off 
rather suddenly.  On the other hand, although unofficial mechanisms are on the decrease 
as well, they don’t taper off as abruptly.  The data collected could not prove with 
certainty if within each particular directorate they favored the use of official or unofficial 
mechanisms.  Table 7 below shows a side by side comparison of the top five official and 
unofficial mechanisms.  Specialized committees, IPTs, technical interchanges, and 
working groups were all included into one category called formal gatherings.  Although 
CRADAs appear to be the overall most utilized mechanism, the significant usage of the 
top five unofficial mechanisms demonstrates an important role in how laboratories 
conduct T2.  From these results we can observe that by combining all mechanisms into 
one category that unofficial mechanisms account for three of the top six methods used for 
T2.  This is an important consideration to understand when it comes to supervision 
mandating which mechanisms to utilize. 




**Each percentage represents usage of that mechanism among the 26 interviewees 
Perceived Barriers which Impede Technology Transfer 
In the previous sections, emphasis has been placed on the official and unofficial 
mechanisms that are preferred by the scientists and engineers within the AFRL 
community.  This next segment will focus on the barriers perceived by lab employees 
which hamper the progress of T2.  Table 8 provides a synopsis of these results; the data is 
again separated by directorate and barriers perceived.  The table shows cumulative 
barriers perceived among all interviewees (shown at the bottom of the table).  
Percentages are not meant to be cumulative and should not be expected to add up to 
100%.  Results will show overlaps due to individual interviewees perceiving multiple 
barriers. 
The overwhelming response among interviewees which contributed the most 
detriment towards an effective T2 process is associated with funding issues.  The first 
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aspect of funding that will be looked at is what is referred to in the DoD as “color” of 
money.  As with most federal agencies, funds are distributed to labs in a manner in which  
they must be used for a specific purpose.  In the case of the labs at AFRL, funds are 
separated by the type of work being performed.  Figure 3 gives a visual representation of 
the different stages of research that AFRL is involved in.  The Science and Technology 
(S&T) stages are designated by the numbers 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 which is where the majority 
of T2 occurs.  Stages 6.4 and 6.5 encompass where technology transition to the user 
occurs and further refinement of products is done.  The increase in numbers also exhibits 
a change from general investigative work to a more refined and focused effort.   
Of those that concluded that funding was a problem, approximately 90% of the 
interviewees admitted to have access to only 6.1 and 6.2 stage funding.  This precludes 
these offices from continuing research once it has reached one of the described stage  
Table 8.  Perceived Barriers which Impede Technology Transfer 
 




     
Figure 3.  AFRL Research Stages [2] 
 
boundaries.  Scientists and engineers have had to devise ingenious methods to either 
request funds from other organizations or to re-appropriate funds to continue their effort.   
All this extra toil takes time and manpower that labs are not outfitted to handle.  Along 
with “color” of money issues there is also the problem with overall lack of designated 
funds to accomplish T2.  Labs are forced to use out-of-hide funds to accomplish a 
mandated T2 mission.  Another interviewee mentioned a particular problem they had 
encountered when they were given congressionally linked funds.  In essence their 
industry partner had already been chosen for them and their research efforts guided; there 
was little flexibility given to them.  Even though the reality of acquiring specific funds to 
accomplish T2 is nonexistent, laboratories should at least be given more latitude to use 
the funds they already have.   
 A lack of strategic vision and a lack of formal training were mentioned as trouble 
spots by 27% of the interviewees.  Strategic vision was most commonly treated as the 
ability to receive support for T2 by their superiors.  This realm of strategic vision 
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included the ability to push a T2 mentality forward, provide adequate manpower, and 
supply sufficient funding.  Most interviewees agreed that T2 was treated as more of a lip-
service tactic by superiors and expected the lower level scientists and engineers to “just” 
handle it.  In a recent article, “Causes of Weakness of T2 from R&D Centres to Economy 
Practice and Ideas How to Make this System more Efficient”, the author identifies this 
lack of support from upper management as a lead cause for failing T2 [38].  For the 
majority of directorates involved in this research, formal training on T2 was either absent 
or very minimal.  Although there is training offered by many government agencies, 
interviewees were either not aware where the training was held or believed that it wasn’t 
targeted specifically enough.  Support from the top is an absolute need in order for T2 to 
become successful.  Individuals in leadership positions should be able communicate the 
needs and goals of their organization and be able to provide the proper tools to 
accomplish those goals. 
 Trust was mentioned as an important aspect of creating useful T2 connections by 
three interviewees.  They found that establishing a long-lasting rapport with industrial 
partners was a necessity to achieve good results in T2.  This issue was also discovered as 
a salient method for accomplishing T2 in an article where they refer to trust as the people-
mover model [39].  This trust matter is also associated with the previously mentioned IPR 
issue.  When a healthy bond is established with commercial partners, the government 
tends not to worry about IPR issues, such as which side will own the rights to the new 
technologies being developed.  They are understood either through prior expectations or 
through formal agreements.  A lack of market analysis referred to the inability of lab 
employees to recognize the needs of the commercial world.  Filtering needs applies to the 
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opposite end in which too many industrial partners flood the government labs with 
technologies that have little or no applicability on the federal side.  The research showed 
that there is no specific process in place to sieve all requests coming in.  This proved to 
be also true in an article titled, “T2:  A New Culture” [4], where the author expresses their 
concern with the inability for both sides to inventory and express their needs.  Insertion 
of technology refers primarily to the timing at which a technology can be transferred 
appropriately.  This timing depends heavily on the needs of both parties at that particular 
time.  One interviewee mentioned that in their eyes, most government labs function in a 
“stovepipe” fashion.  Because of the way they conduct business, they are not encouraged 
to work outside of their realm of responsibility.  The same interviewee believed that T2 is 
a multi-faceted practice in which many different fields come together to make it happen, 
not just scientists and engineers.  It is their belief that the labs do not have the appropriate 
infrastructure to accomplish most T2 [40].  The bureaucracy associated with constructing 
some of the official mechanisms also seemed to be a deterrent, but appeared to be only 
prevalent in those organizations that did not use many of the official means.  Finally, one 
final perceived barrier was the difficulty behind getting both government agencies and 
industrial partners to participate in the many conferences, symposiums, and seminars that 
are available.             
 As expressed by the majority of the interviewees, although barriers will not 
preclude one particular division from conducting T2, it will put a severe hamper on the 
way it is done.  It is time and money wasted that could otherwise be used elsewhere.  All 
of these barriers seem to have a common link which could be resolved by alerting the 




The Push vs. Pull Dichotomy Among Directorates  
 There is a distinct variation made between technology that is pushed out from the 
laboratories and technologies that are developed in the labs as a result of user pull.  
Interviewees were frank about acknowledging that those projects that are pulled by 
consumer demand are more likely to succeed than projects which are pushed out to the 
user.  Furthermore, the commercial success of a technology is often more dependent on 
user acceptance than on the technology itself [41].  Within the AFRL, user pull is often 
known as a lab with a supportive role while those that tend to push technology identified 
themselves as investigative laboratories.    
 Throughout the entirety of the research, interviewees had a simple time 
identifying their organizations as either working in a push or pull system.  Whether their 
organization used a push or pull method to accomplish T2 depended primarily on the 
structure of their organization and the technologies with which they were involved.  
Table 9 summarizes the 26 interviews conducted, distinguishes the organizations 
involved, and shows whether they used a pull or a push system.  One interviewee was not 
considered; this was the individual that identified themselves as a PI.  As a PI, they are a 
neutral entity, and do not initiate which system to use. 
Close to 85% of the interviewees agreed that their organization was in more of a 
supportive role, 27% established they played more of an investigative role, and 15% 
admitted to being involved in both.  Again, these percentages are not meant to be 
cumulative due to some interviewees using both systems.  The organization type played a 
vital part in what type of interaction was being generated by that specific directorate; 
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those that tended to await user pull, had great techniques to keep the pulse of the users 
while those that involved themselves in technology push had less established means of 
communicating with the user.  The type of technology the labs were involved in also 
aided in distinguishing them as either working a pull or push system.  In the DoD, there 
are certain technologies for which they must always find something faster, lighter or 
more efficient; these are usually what the public refers to as “breakthrough” technologies.  
These require intensive amounts of investigative work without the possibility of an 
identified end user.  Contrary to that, there are those technologies that have targeted users 




Table 9.  Directorate Push vs. Pull Usage   
 
**Results are not meant to be cumulative; will not add to 100% 
 
 
The M&M directorate was one of the organizations within AFRL to collaborate in 
this research through the participation of multiple interviewees, fourteen total.  With the 
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exception of one, all interviewees declared that at least 95% of their workload was 
comprised of a support role towards a specific Air Force program office.  The majority of 
these program offices lead the efforts in sustaining Air Force airframes.  Because the 
majority of their work deals with supporting these airframes, they are involved heavily in 
what they refer to as “quick-response teams.”  These teams are tasked to find a solution 
after either a deficiency has been identified or a mishap has occurred and a quick fix is 
required to prevent an aircraft fleet from being grounded.  The entire process seems 
complicated, but works rather well because of the infrastructure that is already in place.  
This process involves the prime contractor of the airframe to be involved in the 
development of the new process or material.  After all, they contain the utmost experts 
concerning most Air Force airframes.  New processes are developed through co-
developments that either involve day-to-day interaction with the contractors or 
established meetings to share expertise.  It is important to note the pattern occurring 
within the M&M directorate.  This directorate’s primary focus is to support the end user 
in a direct fashion and careful attention must be paid to the type of mechanisms utilized. 
Having analyzed the results pertaining to the M&M directorate, T2 is occurring in 
this situation with no real formal mechanism in place.  There is a formal relationship 
established between the government laboratory and industry through either a past or 
existing support contract.  Because of this already established rapport, the means are 
already in place to begin T2 and all that is left undone is to agree on the terms.  This 
typically involves minor modifications to the already existing contracts.  Both parties 
have vested interests; the government must keep their planes in the air and industry has 
an interest because it is a long-term investment for future business.  Furthermore, any 
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new technologies discovered could be used in future products.  This relationship proves 
that there are situations where T2 will occur without the aid of formal mechanisms. 
 Although the use of technology pull far surpasses push, there are still instances 
where push is occurring within AFRL.  The majority of the interviewees agree that 
technology push is ineffective and very time consuming, although it has proven 
groundbreaking at times.  The Prop directorate demonstrates that within their 
organization, technology push is an essential key in conducting business.  Because their 
work is focused on providing improved thrust performance for airframes through either 
mechanical means or fuels technology, they must always be on the cusp of novel 
concepts.  In one example, the lab established an informal agreement with the Tampa 
Police Department in which they traded a new fuel additive for helicopters in return for 
usage feedback [33].  This initial form of T2 could evolve into a more formal mechanism.  
Another form of push that occurs in many labs and is seen as an afterthought is the use of 
end-of-year funds.  Funds left over at the end of the fiscal year, are utilized in the 
investigation of new technologies.  Although results did not demonstrate that there were 
any significant outliers, it was noted through the interviewee’s comments, that the Prop 
directorate had more of a propensity to use technology push than other directorates.  This 
was attributed heavily to the type of technology mentioned above.   
 The overwhelming response to why more technology push was not being 
accomplished was due to both the lack of funding and strategic vision.  The majority of 
the interviewees’ work revolves around a project-oriented focus rather than finding 
innovative solutions to problems.  Most labs that have been involved in technology push, 
find themselves squandering government funds on technologies that end up on a shelf 
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without a customer.  The other cause of failing pushed technologies is attributed to a 
funding issue.  Labs, because of the type funding they utilize and the constraints 
associated with them, are forced to utilize funds for very specific purposes.  If 
technologies are to mature into something more than a prototype, development funds 
have to be introduced from another organization to complete the integration process.  
These are not always available and require additional involvement from another agency.     
 There was a definite correlation with those individuals that utilized technology 
push and also had a concrete strategic vision.  These scientists and engineers were given 
the support they needed from their supervisors in the form of funding and guidance to 
accomplish investigative work.  Although the support was present, many times the 
appropriate infrastructure was not.  Many of labs admitted to not having the adequate 
knowledge and manpower in the right places to allow T2 to flow more smoothly.  
Conversely, technology pull was demonstrated through the interviews to work better 















V. Discussion and Recommendations 
Discussion  
The original intent of this research was to investigate scientists and engineers 
within the laboratories and discover how they accomplished T2 on an everyday basis.  
Subjects were acquired completely at random and allowed for a perspective previously 
unknown to the Air Force T2 program manager.  This was a key in attaining the results 
presented in this study.  The recommendations expressed in this chapter are solely based 
on the results acquired through interviews and the literature review conducted.  Since the 
literature review for T2 within the federal government is limited, some inferences had to 
be made from those commercial applications.  As with any research, there are always 
limitations that could skew the data collected.  This study was no different; there were 
various issues that could seriously distort the results.  Taking into consideration these 
limitations, suggested future studies were recommended that could either supplement this 
study or give it a complete new twist. 
The subsequent recommendations were based on the below conclusions 
summarized from the previous chapter:   
(1)  There are organizations leveraging the use of official mechanisms and are reaping the 
benefits.  Those that are not using mechanisms are because they either lack the 
knowledge to do so or lack the infrastructure to implement them. 
(2)  Unofficial mechanisms are used almost as prevalently as official ones.  The problem 




(3)  Most organizations lack in one way or another a sense of strategic vision.  This 
vision is linked to the other three barriers:  lack of trust, funding issues, and lack of 
training.  All of these barriers are related to the leadership of an organization.           
 
Recommendations 
The key purpose of this study was to identify all mechanisms utilized by scientists 
and engineers shown in the previous chapter.  Through the use and interpretation of the 
qualitative results gathered, additional meaning can be provided to the recommendations.  
Recommendations are based from a perspective in which resources, both manpower and 
funding, are left untouched, but could be manipulated and moved around.  These 
recommendations were made in a more general basis which could be applied to any 
directorate.  The recommendations were structured in a manner where a perceived barrier 
discovered could be overcome by a proven mechanism found in this research.  Specific 
solutions for specific directorates were not thought appropriate.  Below is a list of those 
recommendations and some insight on how to implement them: 
 
1.)  Improve the infrastructure for the top-five most utilized official mechanisms. 
 Initially, there must be a proviso established that this suggestion should be 
implemented at least at the directorate level within AFRL.  Employing a strategy at too 
high of a management level might undermine its intended purpose.  Improving the 
infrastructure requires a lot of aspects.  First, there must be a concentration on getting 
people the adequate knowledge about these mechanisms.  This can be accomplished 
through the use of targeted training and providing access to more on-line resources.  
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Making the ORTAs responsible for knowing which mechanisms are more prevalent in 
their directorate and affording them the autonomy to conduct their own specific training 
in a pro-active manner could prove useful.  Making lessons learned and sample 
documents available through directorate intranet services is also a solution.  A perfect 
application of this method can be made to the prevalent use of CRADAs.  In very distinct 
situations there were organizations that used another organization’s CRADAs and were 
able to apply it to their own agency’s needs.  Having a database available which all 
authorized laboratory personnel can have access to and could do searches on specific 
commercial partners or technologies would be a huge benefit.  Scientists and engineers 
could become more inclined to utilizing CRADAs if they had a system of this sort.  Yet 
another solution could involve the streamlining for the approval processes of these select 
mechanisms.  Ensuring that the approval chain for documents is well known and efficient 
and that the correct people are identified, would garner better results.  This would 
alleviate the problem for those scientists and engineers that are deterred by what they 
refer to as a “lengthy bureaucratic” process.   
Secondly, infrastructure also requires resources; it requires both the adequate 
manpower and funding.  Individuals within directorates in positions of authority should 
be given the power to assign their personnel duties that label them as points of contact 
(POCs) for specific mechanism use.  These POCs could be in addition to the already 
mandatory ORTA positions and should be someone that is involved in the everyday 
interaction with T2; ORTAs are the experts in legislation but might not always be in 
practice.  This position could even be incorporated into what a PI is required to do.  As 
mentioned in Chapter IV, the M&M directorate was the only organization to have hired a 
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PI to work on-site issues.  It is difficult to tell how effective having this position in-house 
really is, but it would definitely be an improvement over the lack of market analysis and 
filtering that is done today.  Manpower is the second portion of resources and is a 
mentality that must be adopted at the strategic level.  Since the idea of supplying labs 
with more personnel, is not a financially viable solution, the labs must discover a way to 
do with what they have already.  It is imperative that all personnel within an organization 
are all on board with the mission and can identify with their portion of it.  This is 
explained once more in Coursey’s and Bozeman’s [42] article where they state, “The 
mission of the laboratory has an influence on the director’s assessments of the advantages 
and disadvantages of technology transfer.”  The director of a laboratory must know what 
their mission is and that of their organization and must be able to spread that to their 
subordinates.  This strategic vision and how it is disseminated is the final portion that 
makes up the entire infrastructure.  This can be best summed up with one of Lee’s [20] 
conclusions presented in his article dealing with T2 from federal labs to industry.  “The 
government must develop an infrastructure for increasing the flow of technology.  It has a 
leadership role in coordinating the development of an infrastructure focusing on effective 
communication and meaningful interactions.  This can be accomplished through effective 
and efficient information transfer mechanisms.”   
        
2.)  Leverage and expand the use of unofficial mechanisms. 
 The same proviso mentioned above concerning the application of this 
recommendation applies to this suggestion as well.  Here again, the leveraging of these 
unofficial mechanisms is dependant on the infrastructure in place to support it.  Since 
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they are considered “unofficial” means of conducting T2, the first step should involve 
developing and disseminating the proper training to educate scientists and engineers on 
the intricacies of these mechanisms and how they can be applied to their specific 
directorates.  The FLC, and in particular the use of their regional conferences, could be a 
great help in the development and the formal dissemination of these guidelines to 
government, academic, and commercial agencies.  Information can also be propagated 
through the use of lessons learned reports and through the establishment of communities 
of interest (CoI) and communities of practice (CoP).  CoIs bring together people with 
common interests, while CoPs bring people together that need a sharing of 
communication and knowledge to accomplish their job.  With these types of gatherings, 
different directorates would be able to share the knowledge they have with other 
directorates and vice versa.        
Strategic vision plays an even more important role in this situation because the 
leadership of an organization is the key to the proper adoption of methods that although 
proven successful, have not been accepted through Air Force regulation.  It is a crucial 
ingredient that these individuals in positions of authority can identify which methods 
pertain to their specific organizations and direct their subordinates to comply with them.  
In an article titled, “Improving Federal to Private Sector T2”, one of the conclusions 
stated that, “the T2 culture starts with upper management providing an environment and 
culture that promotes T2 [43].”   Strategic support is also needed to make the top two 
most used unofficial mechanisms a success.  Conferences, symposiums, and seminars 
require travel funds, as might committees, IPTs, technical interchanges, and working 
groups.  Here is where the leadership of an organization will have to utilize all the tools 
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they possess in order to rearrange their funding to allow their people to travel to these 
important gatherings.   
Those organizations that have used co-locates to aid them in getting other federal 
organizations and industry together to accomplish T2 have proven their method to work.  
If travel funds became a problem, the use of co-locates could be further simplified by 
using some type of alliance mechanism between two federal organizations.  An MOU or 
MOA could be drafted that allowed two federal organizations to benefit from already in 
place individuals that would serve as co-locates without the necessity of having to 
physically displace an employee half way across the U.S.  
 
3.)  Leadership should place more focus on eliminating barriers and less on specific T2 
use. 
 This research has proven that there are many unofficial mechanisms in use 
throughout the AFRL community.  There has not been a study done to measure which 
types of mechanisms work better than others, but until that time, the benefit of the doubt 
must be given to the scientists and engineers in that their use of unofficial mechanism has 
proven successful.  An environment must be created within the laboratories that is 
conducive for individuals to want to use T2 mechanisms.  The leadership must place their 
sole focus on providing the proper people with the precise tools they need and 
eliminating or alleviating those obstacles that retard T2. 
 Funding issues were found to be the most prevalent perceived barrier in Chapter 
IV.  There are obvious aspects of funding that are not within the realm of control of 
certain authoritative figures within each directorate.  What the leadership can do is 
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involve themselves more and have personnel available at their level with both the 
expertise and authority to handle these types of issues.  With the proper infrastructure and 
right amount of support, many of these problems associated with “color” of money could 
be resolved in a more efficient manner. Tackling funding issues requires a particular skill 
set that only trained financial experts have and it would behoove the leadership to involve 
these people to resolve these issues. 
 T2 should not be seen as another mandated directive, but as a way of doing 
everyday business.  It is the task of the leadership within each particular directorate to 
ensure that not only are people using the proper mechanisms, but that T2 is a mentality 
that trickles down from the top.  T2 doesn’t necessarily have to take extra effort or 
manpower, but it will require some reengineering of processes that must be supported 
and guided by the leadership of each directorate.  A formalized strategic vision that is 
understood and supported by all levels of employees is needed; it must be practiced and 
must become the “new” way of doing business.       
    
Limitations of Study 
There are several limitations that should be addressed in this research that could 
cause some results to be questioned for validity.  For the purposes of this research, 
limitations were exposed in one of two ways.  Discussion will include those limitations 
that were observed before research began, and those that were discovered after research 
concluded.   
First, there must be focus placed on the qualitative analysis that was used in this 
research.  As mentioned earlier, qualitative analysis focuses on the behaviors of the 
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interviewees used.  All of the questions utilized were open-ended which allowed 
participants to expound on the answers as they pleased.  Given this type of leeway and 
given that each interview was not conducted under the same exact conditions, could 
result in tainted responses.  There also exists the possibility of distorted results when 
human behavior is involved in the research process.   
Lastly, along with the human behavior aspect, consideration should also be taken of 
the results brought upon by this research; they represent just a mere point in time and 
symbolize the behavior of the sample-size today.  This type of research would be deemed 
extremely difficult to replicate.  There also exists a limitation with the sample size that 
was selected.  There were only 26 interviewees involved in this research and although 
most major directorates within AFRL were included, not all were represented equally. 
 
Future Studies 
The continuation studies mentioned here are based on those deficiencies 
discovered through this research.  First and foremost, there must be an established set of 
metrics that the entire T2 community can agree to which are appropriate for distinct 
agencies.  Not everyone is held to the same standards, but everyone that conducts a 
certain type of business is.  This again is the role of the leadership of each directorate to 
establish.  This future study should use some of the results discovered within this 
research and categorize directorates and other agencies by the type of work they conduct.  
A survey could be employed to poll these agencies and find what metrics they feel are 
appropriate in measuring T2 for their particular organization.  Results collected here 
could be used for additional research and could serve as a basis for future DoD tracking. 
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Once metrics have been established, another future study could involve a 
comparison of methods implemented over a period of time.  These methods could include 
the suggestions provided in this research or the adoption of certain unofficial 
mechanisms.  This study would reveal if the effort to implement these new techniques 
would show dividends or whether it was a wasted effort. 
 An additional future study could expound upon this research, and include a larger 
group of participants that represents the T2 community better.  Because of the lack of 
funds needed to travel to the different organizations shown in Appendix D and other 
locations across the U.S., the population for this research was constrained to local 
participants.  If sponsor funds were acquired, it would allow travel to some of these 
locations to conduct personal interviews.  A larger population could also be taken from 
the AFRL community located at WPAFB.  Some directorates were keener on conducting 
interviews than others, but with the already established relationships, some of these 
difficulties could be lifted.  
A final perspective could be taken that has not been mentioned yet.  Among all 
the discussion concerning T2, it seems that the perspective of industry and academia has 
been forgotten.  There must be a concern and study conducted to uncover the opinions of 
those industry and academia partners and figure out if the mechanisms the government is 
implementing are appropriate and how they could be improved.  This qualitative research 







Appendix A:  List of Acronyms 
 
AFB    Air Force Base  
AFI    Air Force Instruction 
AFMC   Air Force Materiel Command 
AFOSR   Air Force Office of Scientific Research 
AFRL    Air Force Research Laboratory 
ALC     Air Logistics Center 
ASC     Aeronautical Systems Center 
AV   Air Vehicles Directorate 
AWACS  Airborne Warning and Control System 
BOM   Bureau of Mines 
CITI   Collaborative IRB Training Initiative 
CoI   Communities of Interest 
CoP   Communities of Practice 
COSSI  Commercial Operations & Support Initiative 
CRA   Cooperative Research Agreement 
CRADA  Cooperative Research & Development Agreement 
CSC   Computer Sciences Corporation  
CTA   Commercial Test Agreement 
DoD    Department of Defense 
DOE   Department of Energy 
DUST   Dual Use Science & Technology 
EPA    Educational Partnership Agreement 
FAR    Federal Acquisition Regulation 
FLC    Federal Laboratory Consortium 
GAO    General Accounting Office 
GPLR   Government Purpose License Rights 
HE   Human Effectiveness Directorate 
ICR&D  International Cooperative Research & Development 
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IPR    Intellectual Property Rights 
IRB   Institutional Review Board 
IR+D   Independent Research & Development 
LTAP   Local Technical Assistance Program 
ManTech  Manufacturing Technology 
M&M   Materials and Manufacturing Directorate 
MOA    Memorandum of Agreement 
MOU    Memorandum of Understanding 
MPP   Mentor-Protégé Program 
NASA   National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
ORTA   Office of Research and Technology Applications 
O&S    Operation & Support  
PE   Personnel Exchanges 
PI   Partnership Intermediaries 
PLA   Patent Licensing Agreement 
POC   Point of Contact 
Prop   Propulsion Directorate 
R&D    Research & Development 
RoI    Return on Investment 
SBIR   Small Business Innovation Research 
SDB   Small Disadvantaged Business 
STTR   Small Business Technology Transfer  
T2    Technology Transfer 
TTIPT  Technology Transfer Integrated Product Team 
UDRI   University of Dayton Research Institute 


































The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) is made up of more than 9600 government 
people. The blue labels designate the headquarters locations for nine of the laboratory's 
10 technology directorates. 
These include:  
• Space Vehicles (Kirtland)  
• Directed Energy (Kirtland)  
• Information (Rome)  
• Munitions (Eglin)  
• Air Vehicles (Wright-Patt)  
• Materials & Manufacturing (Wright-Patt)  
• Propulsion (Wright-Patt)  
• Sensors (Wright-Patt)  





The green label designates Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR) (Arlington), 
the headquarters location for the laboratory's remaining technology directorate.  
The white labels designate AFRL research sites (areas where one or more directorate 
organizations are located).  
These include:  
• Edwards  
• Kirtland  
• Mesa  
• Brooks  
• Eglin  
• Rome  
• Tyndall  
• Hanscom  
 
The yellow labels designate directorate organizations that are geographically separated 
from their headquarters. These include Propulsion (Edwards), Human Effectiveness 
(Brooks), Human Effectiveness (Mesa), Sensors (Rome), Materials & Manufacturing 
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